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Entitled to Property: Inheritance Laws, Female Bargaining Power, 
and Child Health in India† 
 
Md Shahadath Hossaina   Plamen Nikolov abcd 
 
 
Abstract. Child height is a significant predictor of human capital and economic 
status throughout adulthood. Moreover, non-unitary household models of family 
behavior posit that an increase in women’s bargaining power can influence child 
health. We study the effects of an inheritance law change, the Hindu Succession 
Act Amendment (HSAA), which conferred enhanced inheritance rights to 
unmarried women in India, on child height. We find robust evidence that the 
HSAA improved the height and weight of children. In addition, we find evidence 
consistent with a channel that the policy improved the women’s intrahousehold 
bargaining power within the household, leading to improved parental 
investments for children. These study findings are also compatible with the 
notion that children do better when their mothers control a more significant 
fraction of the family resources. Therefore, policies that empower women can 
have additional positive spillovers for children’s human capital. (JEL D13, I12, 
I13, J13, J16, J18, K13, O12, O15, Z12, Z13) 
 







Height in early childhood is strongly predictive of cognitive ability (Case and Paxson, 
2008), educational attainment (Currie, 2009), labor market outcomes (Smith, 2009; Persico et 
al., 2004), and occupational grade in later life (Case et al., 2009). Stunting, a key marker of 
severely impaired growth and low height-for-age, affects about 25 percent of children under 
five years of age in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) (UNICEF, 2015). The 
prevalence of stunting and malnutrition is particularly acute in India, where 24 percent of the 
world’s stunted children live (WHO, 2021). India’s stunting rate stands at 31 percent, which 
stands as an outlier even when compared to other developing countries.  
Although numerous factors – such as genetics, biology, and disease environment1 – 
influence height in early life, parents and resource allocation at the household level can play a 
crucial role (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982; Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). A key aspect of 
parental resource allocations relates to the locus of control in the family and decision-making 
power, especially women’s bargaining power (Thomas, 1990). Women spend more on 
nutrition (Imai et al., 2014), medical care (Maitra, 2014), childcare (Behrman, 1988; Strauss 
et al., 2000), and exhibit “maternal altruism” (Mason, 1986). Therefore, better female 
bargaining power at the household level can improve girls’ survival rates (Qian, 2008) and 
results in better anthropometric measures (Duflo, 2003).  
In this paper, we explore the effect of the passage of an inheritance law, which 
confers improved inheritance rights to unmarried women in India, on child height. In India, a 
predominantly rural country, land ownership is a critical determinant of economic and social 
status (Agarwal, 1994), and inheritance is the primary way to acquire it. However, 
conventional male-biased inheritance practices and cultural conservatism (Agarwal, 1994) 
engender limited earning opportunities and bargaining power for married women in India. 
Because of the potential to transform women’s inheritance rights, some Indian states 
amended the male-favored Hindu Succession Act (from now on HSA) by providing married 
women an equal share in ancestral property. Improved female bargaining power could 
 
1 Several studies examine the role of genetic factors (Myres et al., 2011; Rootsi et al., 2004), disease 
environment (Bozzoli, Deaton, Quintana-Domeque, 2009). Other studies focus on the role cultural gender 
preference and unequal resource allocations within a family based on perceived returns to investment 




improve human capital outcomes and gender inequality. Thus, enhanced inheritance rights 
for women may improve human capital outcomes and improved the status of daughters. It is 
this possibility that we explore in this paper.  
Our estimation approach relies on the staggered adoption of the HSA amendment 
(hereafter, “HSAA”) across different states in India since 1956. We rely on two primary 
sources of variation related to a woman’s exposure to the HSAA. The first source of variation 
is the timing of a woman’s marriage. The reform in each state only affects unmarried women; 
thus, women who were married before the HSAA are unaffected by the policy.2 The second 
source of variation stems from the HSAA implementation, as some states amended the HSA 
first relative to those states that never amended the law before the 2005 federal amendment. 
The four treated states in our sample are Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and 
Maharashtra. To answer the research question, we use data from the Indian National Family 
and Health Survey (NFHS), a cross-sectional survey with three rounds of data: Wave 1 
(1992-1993), Wave 2 (1998-1999), and Wave 3 (2005-2006). 
We find clear evidence that the passage of the HSAA improved, and substantially so, 
child health. Specifically, we find that the HSA reform improved child height, or the height-
for-age (HFA), by 0.183 standard deviations. Similarly, we detect a substantial effect on 
weight, proxied by the WFA measure, by 0.276 standard deviations. Furthermore, and to shed 
additional light on where these improvements come from, we examine the impact on parental 
investments, and we find the HSAA improved prenatal and postnatal investments. In terms of 
heterogeneous effects, we find evidence that the HSAA positively affects the daughters’ 
health but only on short-term health outcomes, such as weight. We find no evidence that the 
HSAA improved their height or parental care. In terms of the reform’s effects on higher birth 
order children, we find the HSAA has no positive impact for them and may even have an 
adverse effect, via a reduction in the parental allocations, on the health of higher birth-order 
children. Finally, we find no evidence that HSA reform had any favorable impact on 
daughters of higher birth order. 
 
2 One caveat could be that parents can purposefully advance (those who want to avoid devolving property to 
daughters) or delay (those who are gender progressive) daughters’ marriage (Bose and Das, 2017). This sort of 
selection in the marriage timing is not necessarily a concern as the amendments were often implemented 





Although we find strong evidence that the HSA improves child health, our findings 
show that these health benefits accrue mainly to first-born sons only. In India, preference for 
a first-born son can influence household resource allocations among children, especially in 
families of larger size.3 Existing research also documents that later-born children, and 
especially daughters, benefit less from parental investments. Families having more children 
could adversely affect each child’s health due to resource constraints (Booth and Kee, 2005).4 
Furthermore, the gender composition of siblings can put later-born daughters at a 
disadvantage through two mechanisms– sibling rivalry and the fertility-stopping effect 
(Jayachandran and Pande, 2017).5 We specifically examine the impact of the HSAA on 
daughters’ health and later-born children. We find no evidence that the HSAA led to 
improvements in the health of daughters and later-born children.  
We also examine the several channels that are consistent with the positive health 
effect of the HSAA in data. Specifically, we examine the effect of the HSAA on several 
proxies of female empowerment: women’s say about household large purchases, women’s 
say about her health care choices, and women can travel to market alone. We show evidence 
that the HSAA led to a robust increase in female bargaining. The theoretical model 
underlying predictions based on a non-unitary household (Browning et al., 1994) shows that 
an increase in female bargaining power is likely to improve child height. This argument is 
consistent with extensive literature that has tested whether income in the hands of women of 
a household has a different impact on intra-household allocation than income in the hands of 
the men (Duflo, 2012). 
 
3 The patrilineal system stimulates preference for son as sons tend to reside with parents, take on the 
responsibilities of the parents in their old age, work on the family land, and subsequently inherit it. In contrast, 
daughters marry some distance from their natal home and take with them family assets as dowry (Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin 1985). There is existing evidence that son-preference is stronger in families where the first-born 
child is not a son; these families tend to be larger as they keep growing until their desired gender mix of children 
is achieved (Clark, 2000). 
4 However, both sibling composition in the household and resource constraints can play a critical role in 
resource distribution among children, particularly female children (Haan, Plug, and Rosero, 2014). Studies 
showed daughters in families without a son are breastfeed for a shorter period (Haan, Plug, and Rosero, 2014; 
Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011). 
5 A daughter with no elder brother may benefit from a lack of sibling rivalry. Still, the fertility-stopping effect 
reduces resources received by the daughter as the family realizes that they need to try again for a son and start 
saving funds for the next child (an expected son). Jayachandran and Pande (2017) find that the fertility-stopping 





Our study contributes to the existing empirical literature on how female 
empowerment can improve economic outcomes in low-and middle-income countries 
(LMICs). First, we shed light on how an inheritance-related policy, the HSAA6, can affect 
child height in the context of a developing country. The causes of child stunting are 
numerous, ranging from genetics, poor nutrition to repeated disease insults. An inadequate 
diet lacking in calories, protein, or other micronutrients at early ages can affect children’s 
growth. We show clear evidence that female empowerment can exert a significant influence 
on child height. Previous research shows that children’s outcomes improve when women 
have more control in the household (Duflo, 2003; Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997; Qian, 
2008). We add to this literature by showing that one key channel via which female 
empowerment can improve children’s outcomes is via improved inheritance rights standing. 
Second, although female empowerment can improve children’s height in the context of a 
developing country, we also detect cautionary evidence that improvements in female 
bargaining power do not necessarily translate to better human capital outcomes for all 
children. Our findings imply that important gender and birth order considerations likely play 
an essential role as we find no evidence that the HSAA led to improvements in the health of 
daughters and later-born children. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides background on the 
Hindu Succession Act Amendment and evidence on the reform’s impact on female 
bargaining. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the empirical strategy. Section 
V presents the results, and Section VI concludes. 
II. Background 
 




6 Existing research documents the effects of the HSAA on the likelihood to inherit land (Deininger, 2013), labor 
supply and placements into high-paying jobs (Heath and Tan, 2020), and educational attainment (Roy, 2015; 
Bose and Das, 2017). There is also evidence of some negative consequences on domestic violence (wife 
beating), increased suicide rate (Anderson and Genicot, 2015), increased female child mortality (Rosenblum 




In a series of sweeping legal reforms in the 1950s, India introduced the Hindu 
Succession Act (HSA) in 1956. The main objective of the legislation was to unite two existing 
inheritance systems in the country. The Act also aimed to clarify the inheritance rights of 
women over private properties.  
Before 1956, two different systems guided property inheritance in India: Dayabhaga 
(in West Bengal and Assam) and Mitakshara (the rest of India) (Agarwal 1994). From the 
early twelfth century and until the Hindu Succession Act (HSA) enactment in 1956, two 
principal systems guided inheritance procedures within Hindu communities in India. One was 
the Dayabhaga, and the other was the Mitaksara. The Dayabhaga, written by the Indian 
Sanskrit Scholar Jimutavahana, was a Hindu law treatise. The treatise primarily focused on 
rules regarding inheritance procedures within the Hindu community. The Dayabhaga was the 
most decisive authority in Modern British Indian courts in the Bengal region of India. 
The second tradition, the Mitaksara, guided the legal system in the rest of the country. The 
Mitakshara (which translates to measured words) is regarded as an authority even in Bengal 
in all legal matters if no conflicting opinions exist within the Dayabhaga. 
The main distinction between these two systems was how they categorized and 
distinguished between private (separate) and any joint family (or ancestral7) property. Private 
property is generally self-acquired and cannot pass via patrilineal succession (i.e., from a 
male line, such as a father, a grandfather). Ancestral or joint family property, on the other 
hand, is commonly inherited patrilineally. The Dayabhaga system did not distinguish 
between the two types of properties. Under the Dayabhaga system, all heirs, including sons, 
daughters, or widows, could claim over inheriting property. By comparison, the Mitakshara 
system distinguished the inheritance procession depending on whether the property was 
considered private or joint-family property. Under this system, the owner can bequeath any 
privately owned to anyone he wished. However, only coparceners (i.e., sons, grandsons, or 
great-grandsons) could inherit joint family property.  
The HSA aimed to promote gender equity by conferring equal rights over private 
property to women. However, the Act did not apply to the joint family property. Therefore, 
under the HSA, daughters had an equal right to their father’s private property if the Hindu 
 




(i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) male died without a will8 (intestate). However, 
women could not inherit joint family property. In contrast, sons being coparceners had the 
right to inherit the joint family property by birth which implied that their share of the property 
could not be willed away. They could even demand a division of the joint family property in 
case older coparceners are alive. Therefore, and because of its different treatment of men and 
women who could inherit joint family property, the HSA discriminated against women.  
Both the federal and the state governments had legislative authority over inheritance 
issues in India (Roy, 2015).9 Although HSA was a federally mandated law, states could pass 
amendments to it, and these amendments guided the rules within the jurisdictions of these 
states. For instance, Kerala10 (in 1976), Andhra Pradesh (in 1986), Tamil Nadu (in 1989), 
Karnataka (in 1994), and Maharashtra (in 1994) passed state amendments to the HSA. These 
amendments provided Hindu women equal inheritance rights over the joint family property 
so long as they were not married at the time of the amendment11. 
The HSAA, in the Mitakshara system, effectively elevated the status of daughters to that 
of sons, but these benefits pertained to unmarried daughters. Daughters who married before 
the commencement of the HSAA cannot claim coparcenary status in the HSAA. This aspect 
of the law implies that married daughters do not enjoy the same rights regarding a 
coparcenary property as the sons. There are three reasons why the law excluded married 
daughters. First is the dowry practice. Second, in some communities (such as Kammas), 
daughters receive a share of the property at the time of marriage. However, the dowry 
practice is technically illegal in India. Moreover, only a few communities practice giving 
property at the time of marriage. Therefore, a blanket exclusion of married daughters, based 
on an illegal act and practice in a few exceptional communities, cannot be a reasonable 
justification (Sivaramayya, 1988). Finally, there is a cultural mindset that the daughter 
becomes part of the husband’s family, and this mindset plays a significant role.            
 
8 Goyal et al. (2013) argues that the proportion of people who die without preparing a will is very high in India 
(around 65 percent, the share is even higher in rural areas). 
9 The HSA applied to all states except for Jammu and Kashmir, a region that administered its version of the Act. 
Although the Act had special provisions for the matrilineal communities, tribal communities of the Northeastern 
states were excluded as they were matrilineal but ruled by local customs (Agarwal, 1994). 
10 The reforms in Kerala were quite distinct from the other state-level reforms, as they abolished the system of 
joint property altogether (Roy, 2015; Bose and Das, 2017). 
11 The amendments were often implemented retrospectively (Mookerjee, 2019). For example, Andhra Pradesh 




In 2005, India passed a federal amendment, extending the HSAA to the entire country 
regarding the gender disparity over inheritance rights. In particular, the amendment targeted 
and modified Section 6, which had initially provided the basis for gender discrimination on 
who could claim inheritance rights over joint family property. After the passing of the 
amendment in 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that the law had a retrospective effect. Under 
this effect, a daughter could become a co-sharer with her male siblings, and the father would 
not have had to be alive as of 9 September 2005 (when India passed the amendment).   
 
B. Child Health in India  
 
Child height is a significant predictor of adult human capital and better economic 
outcomes (Case and Paxson, 2010). Existing research has also documented the role of several 
crucial channels, such as better adult physical health (Case and Paxson, 2010), cognition 
(Case and Paxson, 2008), social dominance (Hensley, 1993), discrimination (Hamermesh and 
Biddle, 1994), and the social repercussions of being short in adolescence (Persico et al., 
2004).  
Despite India’s economic progress in the last few decades, health outcomes are 
considerably worse than predicted based on international comparisons with other developing 
countries (Drèze and Sen, 2013). Because of the robust empirical evidence regarding the 
critical lifetime influence child health can exert, child height in India has received particular 
attention in the economics literature. The average child under 5 in rural India is about two 
standard deviations shorter than the World Health Organization (WHO) reference population 
for healthy growth. In 2020, 31 percent of Indian children under five remained stunted (WHO 
2021). Thus, despite a GDP per capita higher than that of over 60 countries, India has the 
fifth-highest stunting rate in the world (Krishna et al., 2017). The average child born in India 
is more likely to be stunted than her counterpart in Sub-Saharan Africa, even though their 
mother has higher birth survival; on average, the parents are more affluent and more educated 
(Gwatkin et al., 2007). 
There is also growing empirical evidence regarding the crucial role parental 
investments play in determining child height in India (Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). A 




parental investment based on gender and birth order. For instance, Borooah (2004) shows 
evidence of pro-boy parental investments (in dietary diversity) in children aged up to 24 
months born. DasGupta (1987) shows that although infant girls and boys obtain the same 
caloric intake, families feed girls more cereals while giving boys more milk and fats. 
Fledderjohann et al. (2014) also report higher chances of milk consumption for under-five 
boys than girls.  
However, enhancing female empowerment at the household level and policy 
initiatives to improve female bargaining power can positively influence child health. When 
women are decision-makers within the household, how much they bring to the table can 
impact ultimate choices. Empirically, an extensive literature has tested whether income in the 
hands of women has a different impact on intra-household allocation than income in the 
hands of the men (Duflo, 2012). The evidence suggests that, compared to income or assets in 
the hands of men, income or assets in the hands of women is associated with more significant 
improvements in child health and larger expenditure shares of household nutrients (Thomas, 
1990, 1992). The theoretical model underlying these predictions is of a non-unitary 
household, a household as a collective of individuals with different preferences (Browning et 
al., 1994).  
In India, a predominantly rural country, one crucial way to enhance female 
empowerment relates to inheritance rights for the land and family property. Land ownership 
is a critical determinant of economic and social status (Agarwal, 1994), and inheritance is the 
primary way to acquire it. However, conventional male-biased inheritance practices and 
cultural conservatism (Agarwal, 1994) engender limited earning opportunities and bargaining 
power for married women in India. Because of the potential to transform women’s 
inheritance rights, some Indian states amended the male-favored Hindu Succession Act 
(HSA) by providing married women an equal share in ancestral property. As a result, 
improved female bargaining power could improve human capital outcomes and gender 
inequality.  
In developing countries such as India, high levels of human capital may offer a way to 
escape poverty (Chakravarty et al., 2018). Therefore, policies aimed to improve female 
empowerment can create positive spillover effects for children. Although there is evidence 




human capital accumulation. For example, the provision of improved inheritance rights for 
women can improve children’s human capital outcomes. It is this empirical possibility that 
we attempt to shed light on our analyses. 
 
III. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
A. The Data: A Descriptive Analysis 
 
For our analysis, we use data from the Indian National Family and Health Survey 
(NFHS), a cross-sectional survey comprising three rounds of data: Wave 1 (1992-1993), 
Wave 2 (1998-1999), and Wave 3 (2005-2006). The household survey covers rural and urban 
households. It adopts a stratified multistage cluster sampling method to identify a nationally 
representative sample of the population living in both urban and rural areas in 29 states. The 
survey selected 110,000 households in each wave and collected information from 125,000 
women (aged 15 to 49 years) and 75,000 men (aged 15 to 54 years).  
All women in the age range were eligible for an interview. However, because 
numerous health indicators pertained to the sample of ever-married women and children, the 
required sample size for men was considerably smaller. Thus, of the 216,969 eligible women 
and men, 124,385 women and 74,369 men participated in the survey, yielding a response rate 
of 94.5 percent and 87.1 percent, respectively. 
The survey questionnaire comprises several distinct modules, including a household 
module, a module collecting information from women, and a village information module. 
The household module collected information from face-to-face interviews. It draws 
information from all residents in each sample household. In addition, the survey covers 
demographic information on age, gender, marital status, relationship to the head of the 
household, education, and occupation for each listed person. Based on the household module, 
the survey team identified respondents eligible for the woman’s questionnaire, which 
collected additional demographic information on adult female respondents and their children 
(if any). 
The woman’s questionnaire collects information from all ever-married women aged 




information on socioeconomic characteristics (age, marital status, education, employment 
status, place of residence), reproductive behavior (fertility choice, birth spacing, number of 
children, prenatal and postnatal healthcare use), and quality of care. The module also covers 
questions on all children (their age, sex, birth order, and health information, such as height, 
weight, hemoglobin level, and prior vaccinations). The survey gathered anthropometric 
measures for both adults and children. The NFHS collected data on height and weight 
measurements for children in all rounds. Height data for adults is available only in NFHS-2, 
NFHS-3, and NFHS-4.  
Our analysis sample consists of 67,815 children for whom we have anthropomorphic 
data. We use data on the following fifteen states: the four treatment states are Andhra 
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Karnataka; and the control states are Arunachal 
Pradesh, Bihar, Goa, Gujrat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Panjab, 
Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.12  
 
 
B. Construction of Study Outcomes 
 
Child Health. We use height as an indicator of early childhood health. Height is a stock 
variable and meaningful indicator of accumulated decisions regarding nutritional intake in 
early life (Case and Paxson, 2010). We also use weight as an additional proxy of child health, 
although weight is a flow measure and captures short-term changes to the nutritional 
environment.  
Based on the raw measurements for these variables, we create standardized measures 
for height and weight using additional information on age, height, and weight for all children. 
The two standardized measures for height and weight are height-for-age (HFA) and weight-
for-age (WFA).13 The HFA z-score is available for children under age five. The WHO 
 
12 We exclude Union territories, West Bengal, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, and Northeastern states from our 
analysis. Union territories are politically and administratively different from rest of India; West Bengal and 
Assam practice the Deyabhaga system of property right, which allows girls to inherit various types of property. 
Jammu and Kashmir was not subject to the HSA. Kerala and the eight northeastern states are not part of the 
analysis because they are matrilineal kinship areas (Jayachandran and Pande 2017). 
13 A z-score of 0 represents the median of the reference population, and a z-score of -2 indicates that the child is 




defines children who are two and three standard deviations lower than the mean HFA z-score 
as moderately and severely stunted (WHO, 2006). Similarly, children who are two and three 
standard deviations lower than the mean WFA z-score are defined as moderately and severely 
wasted, respectively.  
 
We also examine other health indicators of child health. We use indicators, such as 
total prenatal visits, whether mother took iron supplementation, tetanus shot, whether the 
delivery was done at a health facility, whether there was a postnatal check within two months 
of birth, and whether the child was ever vaccinated. Postnatal checks are only available only 
for the youngest living child. We also create a composite normalized input index based on the 
prenatal and postnatal inputs. This index helps us gauge the parental investment care for 
children. Furthermore, we measure disease incidence in the last two weeks to capture the 
early childhood disease environment. We do so by constructing a composite index based on 
the following variables: the incidence of the child having a fever in the last two weeks, the 
incidence of cough in the last two weeks, and the incidence of diarrhea in the last two weeks. 
Based on these variables, we create a normalized composite score. 
 
Female Bargaining Power Measures. In addition to the socioeconomic and health  
outcomes in the survey, we also explore outcomes related to childbearing and women’s 
autonomy. The NFHS collects data on the number of children ever born and on the mother’s 
age at first marriage. We measure women’s bargaining by using three binary variables: 
whether the woman has a say about large purchases, whether the woman has a say about her 
own healthcare choices, and whether she can go to market alone. This approach followed the 
methodology adopted by Heath and Tan (2020). Based on the individual indicators, we 
generate a composite normalized index for female bargaining power.  
 
C. Sample Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the main variables. The table reports data 
on the entire sample, the sample in states affected by the policy change (Columns 2 through 




change primarily affects the patrilineal and patrilocal kinship who are Hindus. Therefore, we 
split the sample by religion: column 2 comprises the Hindus affected by the policy; column 3 
reports data only on non-Hindu individuals in the treated states. Columns 5-7 presents the 
summary statistics for the sample (Hindus and non-Hindus) and non-treated states. Table 1 
shows data based on the mothers’ sample: age, age at first marriage, age at first birth, and 
various proxies of bargaining power. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
At the time of first marriage, in both treated and non-treated states, the average 
mother’s age is around 17. However, non-Hindu mothers in all states, regardless of whether 
they reside in areas affected by the policy, marry at a slightly older age (i.e., 20 years). 
However, Hindu mothers living in areas affected by the policy have a lower-than-average age 
at first marriage and a higher-than-average age when they have their first child. Overall, and 
based on the index we construct, Hindu women have lower bargaining power than non-Hindu 
women. However, Hindu women in states affected by the HSAA exhibit higher bargaining 
power than Hindu women in the states that did not adopt the HSAA.  
Turning to the children’s characteristics in the whole sample, Table 1 reports the 
average age to be around two years. As a proportion of all children, the share of daughters is 
nearly identical between states who adopted the HSA or not. The average HFA is -1.918, but 
it is lower in states that adopted the HSA (i.e., -1.659); in states that did not, the HFA is -
1.988. The summary statistics for the WFA measure present the same pattern. Finally, Hindu 
children in non-treated states show a clear disadvantage in prenatal and postnatal health 
inputs. They receive lower parental inputs than Hindu children in treated states.   
IV. Empirical Strategy   
 
To estimate the effect of the HSA amendment on child health outcomes, we take 
advantage of the staggered adoption of the HSAA across states. We use two sources of 
identifying variation. The first source is the timing of a woman’s marriage. The second 




only affects unmarried women when the reform occurred in their state14; women who were 
married at the time of the reform form the control group. Four states – Andhra Pradesh, Tamil 
Nadu, Karnataka, and Maharashtra – adopted the reform. Eleven states did not: Arunachal 
Pradesh, Bihar, Goa, Gujrat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Panjab, 
Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.  
To study the impact of the HSAA on child health, we employ a difference-in-
differences strategy similar to the approach used by Duflo (2001) and by Lavy and Zablotsky 
(2015), i.e., we rely on differences across cohorts and groups affected or not by the policy 
reform. We estimate the effect of the HSA amendments using the following reduced-form 
specification:  
 
 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡Π + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡                     (1)         
 
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the outcome for child 𝑖 born to a mother, who married in year 𝑡, in state 𝑠. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 is a 
dummy variable, and it equals one if the mother is from a state that amended HSA before the 
national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states) and equals zero if not from one of the reform 
states. 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡  is a dummy variable: it takes a value of 1 if the mother was married after the 
reform in her state 𝑠, and takes zero otherwise. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 is a binary indicator, set to 1 
if the mother is from a reform state 𝑠 and was married after the reform in her state 𝑠, and 
equals 0 if she is not exposed to the reform. 𝛼𝑠 is state fixed effect, 𝜇𝑡 is the mother’s year of 
birth fixed effect, and 𝛿𝑠,𝑡 captures state-year fixed effects. State fixed effects capture state-
specific characteristics; the year fixed effect accounts for time-varying but group-invariant 
factors. Finally, the state-year fixed effect allows us to control state-specific time-varying 
omitted variables, which may correlate with the HSAA. 𝑿𝒊  is a set of mother-related 
characteristics (age at first birth, age at first birth squared, age); it also includes child 
characteristics, such as gender, age, and birth order.  
‘The parameter of interest, 𝛽1, captures the effect of the HSAA. The validity of our 
empirical approach depends on two assumptions: (a) no pre-trends exist for the treatment and 
 
14 A potential concern could be out-migration to different states from the state the woman was born. However, 
cultural and linguistic barriers impede cross-state migration in India; cross-state migration is negligible (Roy, 




control groups, and (b) states do not adopt the HSAA in a manner correlated with child 
health.  
Before we proceed with estimating (1), we examine the trend in the outcome variables 
for the treated and non-treated areas. Figure 1 displays the trajectory of the HFA and WFA 
outcomes. For both outcomes, and regardless of the treatment status, the figure reveals an 
upward trend. However, HFA in the treated states is higher than in the non-treated states 
between 1978 and 2004. On the other hand, the WFA is quite similar between the treated and 
non-treated states until 1999; the gap widens after that.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Except for Maharashtra, the HSAA reforms are in southern Indian states. These states 
tend to outperform the rest of the country in terms of child health. However, as noted earlier, 
Table 1 details that the treated areas exhibit better child health indicators than the non-reform 
states. This discrepancy could be a cause of concern for our empirical strategy. 
We conduct an exercise to examine the similarity between the trends of the health 
indicators. Figure 2 displays the trajectory of the average HFA and WFA measures. The 
figure visually compares the evolution of health measures in the reform and non-reform states 
before enacting the HSAA policies. Because the reforms happened in different years, we 
include all reform states up to 1984. For example, in 1985, Andhra Pradesh’s reform was 
enacted. Therefore, we drop it from the comparison group. Likewise, Tamil Nadu enacted the 
reform as a law in 1989. Therefore, we drop the state for 1989 only in this particular data 
exercise. Although the average of the health indicators is higher in the reform states, the trend 
in the HFA and WFA measures is similar. Thus, the overall pattern does not provide visual 
justification for differential trends between the two groups. 
 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 Next, we formally test whether there is a similar evolution pattern of child health in the 




Angrist and Pischke (2009). In this exercise, we use data from both treatment and control states 
before the actual reform. Specifically, we use data until 1984 as the first state amended the 
HSA in 1985. We estimate: 
 
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠) + 𝛿2(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) + 𝛿3(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡Π + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡                     (2)     
 
where 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡  is the outcome for child 𝑖 born to a mother, who married in year 𝑡, in state 𝑠. 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 is a dummy variable, and it equals one if the mother is from a state that amended HSA 
before the national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states) and equals zero if not from one of 
the reform states. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a linear trend of mother’s year of marriage runs from 1970 to 
1984. 𝑿𝒊  is the same set of controls as in equation (1). 𝛽3 captures the differential trend in the 
outcome variable between treated and non-treated states before the HSAA.  
 We report the results for this exercise in Table 2. The coefficients of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
in columns 1 and 3 are insignificant and close to zero for both HFA and WFA. The inclusion 
of controls (reported in columns 2 and 4) only strengthens these results. Therefore, this 
exercise further bolsters the validity of our empirical approach.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
V. Results   
A. Effect of the Reform on Child Health 
Table 3 reports our main results, which are the estimates based on equation (1). The 
dependent variables are the primary health outcomes and the parental investment in child 
health. Our variable of interest, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟, is a dummy capturing whether the mother is 
from a reform state 𝑠 and was married after the reform in her state 𝑠. The table contains the 




primary sampling unit (PSU). All columns of Table 3 include control variable and fixed 
effects (FE)– state fixed effect, year (mother’s year of birth) fixed effect, state-year fixed 
effect, and survey year fixed effect.  
The estimates of the child health outcomes– height-for-age (HFA) z-score and 
weight-for-age (WFA) z-score– are presented in columns 1 and 2. The coefficients of 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  in columns 1 and 2 are positive and statistically significant. For example, in 
column 1, the coefficient of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 is 0.183, which indicates that the HSAA has on 
average increased children’s HFA z-score by 0.183 standard deviations. Similarly, the 
coefficient of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 in column 2 indicates that the HSAA has, on average increased 
children’s WFA z-score by 0.276 standard deviations. These results suggest that women 
favored inheritance rights reform in India has significantly improved child height and weight. 
Table 3 also shows whether the HSAA leads to increased parental investment in 
children’s health. Outcome variables in columns 3-6 are prenatal inputs, and outcome 
variables in columns 7-8 are postnatal inputs. We have four indicators of prenatal inputs 
during pregnancy– total prenatal visits, mother took iron supplementation, mother took 
tetanus shot, and delivery at a health facility. Delivery at a health facility indicates whether 
the childbirth happened at a health facility instead of birth at home. Total prenatal visits and 
delivery at a health facility are available for all children under five years. 
In contrast, data on iron supplement intake and tetanus shot is available only for the 
most recent birth (youngest child). We have two indicators of postnatal parental inputs– 
postnatal check within two months of labor and child ever vaccinated. Postnatal check within 
two months of birth is available only for the most recent delivery (youngest child). Finally, 
the outcome variable in the last column is pooled inputs, which the first principal component 
of the standardized prenatal and postnatal inputs, and then normalized to have mean zero and 
standard deviation one.  
Columns 3 and 9 show the OLS coefficients of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟, and columns 4-8 
show the coefficients of the linear probability model. The coefficients of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 in 
columns 3-6 are positive and statistically significant, except iron supplement intake in 
column 4. The coefficient in column 3 shows that the HSAA leads to about 0.81 higher 
prenatal visits during pregnancy. Similarly, the HSAA has increased the probability of a 




The coefficients of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 for postnatal visits within two months is 0.139, 
suggesting that the HSAA has increased the likelihood of postnatal check within two months 
of birth by about 14 percent. Although the coefficient associated with the person being ever 
vaccinated is negative, the overall pooled input corroborates the significant positive effect of 
the HSAA.  The coefficient of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 in column 9 indicates that the amendment has 
increased overall parental investment in children by about 36 percent.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
We examine whether there is an upward trajectory of the health outcomes (HFA or 
WFA) in correspondence with the area adopting the HSAA. For this exercise, we estimate 
equation (1) substituting the HSAA policy variable with a complete set of dummy variables 
going from eight years before adopting the HSAA eight years later. We display the results in 
Figure 3. The figure displays the coefficients associated with the dummy variable in a 
specification where the outcome variables are the two primary outcomes, the HFA and the 
WFA measures. Figure 3 shows no evidence that the improvement in the health outcomes 
occurred before the HSAA enactment. None of the displayed coefficients for the years prior 
or the years following the HSAA enactment in a particular state are significantly different 
from zero. This exercise bolsters the results reported in Table 3, as it will be challenging to 
account for the improvements of the health outcomes in the years immediately following the 
HSAA enactments. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Another way to investigate the possible selection into the HSAA is to formally test for 
any correlation between the HSAA and average child health before the amendments. The 
earliest survey years available for child health is from the NFHS-1 for the 1992-1993 period. 
Given that our objective is to examine the relationship between the HSAA and health 
outcomes at the baseline period, we focus on the states that adopted the HSAA after 1993: 
Maharashtra (1994) and Karnataka (1994). Unlike the subsequent survey waves used in the 




we analyze the health outcomes for Hindu-only households at the district level. We estimate 
the following equation.  
𝐻𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑑 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐻𝑑
1993 + 𝑋𝑑
1993Π + 𝜂𝑑                     (3)         
 
where 𝐻𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑑 is a dummy variable equals one if the district is subject to HSA amendment 
after 1993 and before the national adoption in 2005, and equals zero otherwise; 𝐻𝑑
1993 is the 
child health outcomes–HFA and WFA z-scores– in district 𝑑 in the year 1992-93; 𝑿𝒅
𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟑 is 
the vector of controls capturing the average of various socioeconomic characteristics for the 
district in 1992-93 (i.e., mother’s age at first birth, mother’s age at first birth squared, 
mother’s current age dummies). We estimate equation (3) twice for the HFA and WFA 
outcomes. Table 4 reports the results.  
We first regress the district’s HSAA status on the average HFA z-score in 1992-93, 
without any other controls (column 1 of Table 4 reports the results). The coefficient of HFA 
is close to zero and statistically insignificant. The inclusion of controls in column 2 does not 
alter the result: we find no evidence of a correlation between the HSAA adoption and HFA 
outcomes. We obtain similar results for WFA outcome (at the district level), thereby 
bolstering our claim regarding the absence of a relationship between the HSAA and both 
child health outcomes.     
B. Placebo Exercises 
 
 We conduct a falsification exercise to examine the validity of our estimation approach. 
Specifically, we re-estimate our estimation equation (1) model but among the sample of 
Christians. Since the HSAA affects only the Hindu population, this particular placebo exercise 
should produce no effects of the HSAA for the Christian sample. Table 5 reports the results 
based on this placebo test. The coefficient of interest, based on the OLS estimation, is the 
estimate for the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 variable. The associated estimates for HFA and WFA 
outcomes are close to zero and statistically insignificant. Similarly, the linear probability model 
coefficients (reported in columns 4-8) and the OLS coefficient (reported in column 9) are close 




estimation method and is evidence that our estimation technique does not pick up spurious 
effects on child health outcomes.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
C. Heterogeneity  
 
Next, we examine how the HSAA affects child health among later-born children and 
daughters. Specifically, we test whether daughters or later-born children exhibit more 
significant health improvements. The HSAA effects on human capital could differ by 
additional factors, such as gender and birth order. For example, the possible preference 
among parents for having a healthy eldest son could play a role. The issue pertains to Hindu 
families because of their patrilocal and patrilineal kinship systems. In addition, Hindu 
religious texts emphasize rituals that only a male heir can perform (Arnold, Choe, and Roy 
1998).  
To test for these effects, we re-estimate (1) by adding interaction terms for two 
demographic factors, gender and birth order:  
 
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑖) + 𝛽2(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑂𝑖) + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡Π + 𝛼𝑠
+ 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡        (4)    
 
𝑂𝑖 denotes several demographic characteristics, such as birth order and gender. Specifically, 
we test whether the coefficient on the primary interaction is positive and statistically 
significantly different from zero. 
We report the results in Tables 6 through 8. Table 6 reports the results from regressions 
estimated at the child level, and we examine the impact on the same set of outcomes as in Table 
3. We focus on the coefficient of the interaction 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙. Columns 1, 2, and 9 
report the estimates for the HFA z-score, WFA z-score, and the pool inputs index, respectively. 
We see a positive coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙, but the coefficient is significant only 




the daughter’s weight, but we cannot make the same claim for the HFA z-score and the parental 
inputs, as these two outcomes are not statistically significant.  
In Table 7, we report the estimations examining the effect of the HSAA by birth 
order. The coefficient, Treat × After × 2nd Child and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 3𝑟𝑑 +  𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑, 
display the HSAA effects on height (Columns 1), weight (Column 2), and parental 
investments (Column 9). We see a positive coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙, but the 
coefficient is significant only for the WFA z-score outcome. For the health and weight 
outcomes, the coefficients on the interaction terms are not statistically significant. Strikingly, 
the signs of the coefficients for the parental investments associated with 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 ×
2𝑛𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 3𝑟𝑑 + 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 are not only negative but also statistically 
significant at the 5-percent level. Thus, the HSAA has no positive effect for higher-born 
children and may have an adverse effect, via the parental allocations, on higher birth order 
children.  
To test for both gender and birth order effects, we estimate (4) interacting the 
treatment with higher birth order and gender dummy variables. The coefficient of 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 2𝑛𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 × 𝐺𝑖𝑟l captures the policy effect among second-born daughters. 
The coefficient of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 3𝑟𝑑 + 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 × 𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙 captures the policy effect among 
second-born daughters. Again, for none of the outcomes, the interactions are statistically 









15 In a separate extension exercise, we also examine whether the timing of the HSAA influenced child health 
differentially by child age. We report the results of this estimation in Appendix Table A1. There is suggestive 




Although we have presented considerable evidence on how the HSAA improves child 
health, we have not yet addressed the channels via which the HSAA likely improved health 
outcomes.  
Several potential mechanisms can rationalize our findings. Modeling the household 
decisions for human capital investments is a challenging task. At the core of various 
explanations, which could explain our findings, is the non-unitary model of household 
bargaining and how changes in household bargaining influence subsequent parental 
investments into the human capital for children. A large body of evidence from developing 
countries supports the idea that households are not unitary entities and that bargaining power 
is crucial (Duflo, 2001; Qian, 2008). If we assume two parents in a non-unitary household 
model, the HSAA inheritance law changes positively influence the female bargaining power 
within the household. The HSAA allowed women to inherit property. It also increased their 
unearned income and raised their bargaining power (Heath and Tan, 2020). 
The HSAA could lead to several channels conceptually consistent with an increase in 
child health. We first discuss each of these primary channels, and then we turn to the data to 
examine the empirical support for them. Using the variation due to the HSAA 
implementation across states, we examine how the Act influenced each of these potential 
channels at the household level.16 We first examine the effect of the HSAA on each of the 
proposed channels. We estimate: 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡) + 𝑋𝑚𝑠𝑡Π + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑚𝑠𝑡                     (5)         
 
𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡  is a proxy measure for each of the proposed channels; 𝑚 denotes the individual index in 
state 𝑠 who was married in year 𝑡. We define all other variables as in the previous 
specifications.  
A first possibility, because of the HSAA, is fertility stopping behavior and delaying 
childbearing. Suppose the wife gains bargaining power (conceptualized by having higher 
autonomy over household resources) due to the HSAA. In that case, the HSAA policy will 
likely reduce childbearing and delay childbearing as empirical evidence from India points to 
 




females having a lower preference for children and preference for bearing later. 
((Bhattacharya, 2006).   
The second channel relates to an increase of unearned income by women. The HSAA 
raises the woman’s level of unearned income due to enhanced access to land inheritance. In a 
noncooperative household bargaining framework, this could translate to better control over 
the woman’s income and thereby better gains for the female in the household from her 
working. Heath and Tan (2020) show empirical evidence that the HSAA increase female 
labor supply. This increase in the wife’s labor supply did not come at the expense of the 
husband’s labor supply, allowing for a higher household income resulting from the HSAA. 
Additional household income may influence height through increasing calorie intake or the 
quality of the diet. Even if increased food intake does not directly come from the increase of 
total household income, reducing household size via reductions in childbearing (noted earlier) 
can lead to a higher nutritional intake per person.  
Third, the disease environment in early childhood can play a critical role in 
influencing child health. Child height is a function of net nutrition, and net nutrition is the 
difference between food intake and the losses to activities and disease. In India, especially in 
rural parts, there is a high burden of diarrheal disease, fevers, or respiratory infections. These 
can impose a nutritive tax on one’s nutritional status in early childhood and subsequently on 
child height. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that inadequate prenatal nutrition, which is 
quite prevalent in India, causes low birth weight and worsens child health. Finally, infections 
during early childhood infections may have consequences for child height because they can 
sap energy required for physical growth. Both respiratory and gastrointestinal infections can 
impact height (Victora, 1990). 
Finally, higher female bargaining power within the household can improve child 
outcomes. Existing research shows that an increase in women’s income or bargaining power 
within the household benefits children more than increases in men’s income (Thomas, 1990, 
Lundberg et al., 1997, Attanasio and Lechene, 2002). Households in which women’s income 
share is higher spend a more significant fraction of their income on children’s clothing and 
food, and children in these households are better fed. There are potentially two hypotheses 
put forth that could explain this phenomenon. The first relates to women and men having 




concerned about their children and men’s well-being. This issue, combined with the 
assumption that women’s preferences matter more if their income share within the family 
goes up, can rationalize higher spending patterns on children’s needs, such as their health and 
education. According to this preference hypothesis, when giving transfers to women versus 
men, the trade-off is between additional spending on children versus private consumption of 
men. There is a second possibility called the specialization hypothesis. According to this 
hypothesis, differential spending can be explained by specialization by the household 
members. According to this framework, women and men specialize in different tasks based 
on their comparative advantage. For example, if women have lower wages than men, they 
specialize in time-intensive tasks, including childcare and food preparation. On the other 
hand, men will take charge of tasks that require money but little time, such as saving and 
investing. 
 
E. Supporting Evidence 
 
Data limitations prevent us from taking on one particular channel against the others. 
Considering the assumptions required make a formal mediation analysis highly challenging 
in the context of our question. In what follows, we attempt to shed more light on the 
plausibility of some of the hypothesized channels using the available NFHS data. Table 9 
reports the results from specification (5).  
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
Childbearing: In Columns (1) and (2), we explore the childbearing channel with two 
outcomes: the total number of children ever born and the age at first marriage. The results 
reported in Table 9 show evidence consistent with the idea that among Hindu women living 
in HSAA-implementing states, the total number of children born decreased (in Column 1). 
Furthermore, there is evidence of delay in marriage (Column 2) and the first child’s timing 
(not reported). Overall, this fertility decline leads to reduced household size via reductions in 





Household Wealth: The NFHS does not collect income measures or any specific proxies of 
earnings by a household member. Therefore, we use two survey questions to proxy household 
wealth to capture the potential income effects. We rely on survey questions, whether the 
household has electricity and whether the household has piped water to proxy the change in 
household wealth in HSAA-implementing areas. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 9 report the 
results. The results show that both coefficients are positive and statistically significant, 
consistent with a positive income effect.  
 
Disease Environment: In Column (5) of Table, we explore the possibility that the HSAA 
directly affects the disease environment in households. We show the results on a composite 
index based on the following variables: whether the child had a fever in the last two weeks, 
the incidence of cough in the last two weeks, and the incidence of diarrhea in the last two 
weeks. The coefficient displayed in column (5) is not statistically significant. Therefore, 
empirical evidence supports that the positive height impacts likely do not operate through a 
disease environment channel. 
 
Female Bargaining Power: We explore the women’s bargaining channel using various 
empowerment measures available in the NFHS. Specifically, we use three decision measures: 
whether the woman has a say about large purchases (Column 6), whether she has a say about 
her own healthcare choices (Column 7), and whether she goes to the market alone (Column 
8). We combine these measures using a composite female bargaining measure (Column 9). 
The coefficients associated with the female bargaining proxies are positive and statistically 
significant, implying that the female bargaining power increased due to the HSAA.  
The above explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Given the robust 
effects on the bargaining channel and the fact that higher wealth, through unearned income 
for the women due to the HSAAs, is likely to boost further female autonomy, we specifically 
examine the effects of the bargaining power channel on child health. We do so by 




instrument for female bargaining power using the composite index.17 We estimate the 
following equation: 
𝐻𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑠?̂? + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡Π + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡                     (6)         
 
We define the variables as before. The HSAA instruments 𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑠?̂? , the female bargaining 
power.  
Table 10 reports the results based on this approach. In columns (1) and (2), we show 
the impact on the HFA and WFA measures. In columns (3) through (6), we show the effect 
on prenatal inputs; columns (7) and (8) report the effects on postnatal inputs. Finally, column 
(9) reports the impacts on the composite index. The coefficients in columns (1), (2), and (9) 
are positive and statistically significant. Therefore, the results support the claim that higher 
female bargaining power at the household level improved child health in HSAA-
implementing areas.  We also examine whether the inclusion of other variables, particularly 
wealth proxies, knocks out the strong effect of the female bargaining power on child health 
(reported in Table 10). We conduct an additional exercise in which we interact wealth proxies 
with the bargaining power index and examine whether the effect size associated with the 
bargaining power variables changes after the inclusion of additional variables. The effect size 
of the bargaining power variable remains stable after the inclusion of these interaction terms. 
Although this exercise cannot rule out the possibility that wealth exerts an independent effect 
on child health, it strongly suggests that the bargaining power channel likely plays a critical 
role.  
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
 
17 Although we use the HSAA as an instrument for bargaining power, we conduct an additional robustness 
exercise. In this exercise, we adopt the approach proposed by Nevo & Rosen (2012), and we allow for the 
instrument to be correlated with the error term. However, we assume that the correlation is weaker than the 
correlation between the instrumental variable and the endogenous variable itself. Using the econometric 
technique, proposed by Nevo & Rosen (2012), we bound the parameter of interest. The purpose of this 
additional consistency check is to ascertain the bounds the parameter of interest in case the instrumental variable 
does not fulfill the classical exclusion restriction assumption. Appendix A, Table A4 reports the results. The 





We also further drill down on how improved female bargaining affects children by 
various demographic characteristics. We specifically examine the effect of improved 
bargaining power by birth order and by the gender of the child. Although the effect for 
children of higher birth order or daughters is ambiguous dependent on the maternal 
preferences for these two characteristics, there is evidence from other settings (Duflo, 2003) 
that more income in the hands of mothers tends to benefit daughters more than sons. We 
report results based on specification (6) where we interact 𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑠?̂?  with additional covariates 
for birth order and the gender of the child. Appendix A Table A2 and Table A3 report the 
results on child health using interactions for birth order and gender, respectively. The results 
show no evidence to support the claim that higher female bargaining power benefits either 
higher-order births or daughters more. 
In sum, we cannot rule out the possibility that some of these channels in tandem 
improved child health. We also show robust empirical evidence that female bargaining power 
likely played a crucial role in improving child health because of the HSAA. 
 
VI. Conclusion   
 
Child height is a significant predictor of adult human capital and better economic 
outcomes. Nevertheless, India’s stunting rate stands at 31 percent, an astonishingly high 
prevalence rate even for developing countries. Moreover, because of the potential to 
transform women’s inheritance rights, some Indian states amended the male-favored Hindu 
Succession Act (HSA) by providing unmarried women an equal share in ancestral property. 
This paper studies the effect of the passage of inheritance law amendments (the HSAA), 
which conferred improved inheritance rights to unmarried women in India, on child height.  
 We exploit the staggered adoption of amendments to the HSA across different states 
in India since 1956. We find clear evidence that the passage of the HSAA improved, and 
substantially so, child health. To corroborate whether improved parental care drives these 
effects, we show that the HSAA generated higher prenatal and postnatal investments in the 
areas that implemented the HSA amendments. We interpret these effects as mainly driven by 




improvements in the wife’s unearned income. We show empirical support to claim that 
enhanced female autonomy at the household level can improve child health. This finding 
bolsters previous research showing that income in the hands of women (within the 
household) has a different impact on intra-household allocation than income in the hands of 
the men.  
In developing countries such as India, improvements in human capital can offer a way 
to escape poverty. We explore several mechanisms, and we show that female empowerment 
can exert an important role in improving child health via improved inheritance rights. 
Moreover, our paper suggests that the enhanced inheritance rights for women may have far-
reaching implications beyond their economic welfare, affecting human capital accumulation 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
   
Full 
Sample 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Household have electricity (1=if yes) 0.633 0.823 0.890 0.836 0.578 0.779 0.579 
 (0.482) (.382) (0.313) (0.370) (0.494) (0.415) (0.494) 
Household receive piped water at home (=1 if yes) 0.315 0.504 0.444 0.530 0.247 0.470 0.258 
 (0.465) (0.50) (0.497) (0.499) (0.431) (0.499) (0.437) 
Mother’s age (years) 26.11 24.81 26.52 24.96 26.22 28.97 26.41 
 (5.40) (4.72) (5.33) (4.84) (5.38) (5.59) (5.50) 
Mother’s age at first marriage (years) 17.36 17.60 20.34 17.65 17.24 20.96 17.28 
 (3.28) (3.51) (4.50) (3.52) (3.16) (4.71) (3.21) 
Total children born to a mother 3.027 2.383 2.00 2.461 3.081 2.781 3.179 
 (1.911) (1.372) (1.101) (1.458) (1.904) (1.917) (1.988) 
Say about large purchase (=1 if yes) 0.496 0.515 0.569 0.513 0.48 0.704 0.491 
 (0.5) (0.5) (0.496) (0.5) (0.5) (0.457) (0.5) 
Say about own health (=1 if yes) 0.549 0.569 0.636 0.57 0.531 0.68 0.543 
 (0.498) (0.495) (0.482) (0.495) (0.499) (0.467) (0.498) 
Go to market alone (=1 if yes) 0.409 0.548 0.602 0.533 0.361 0.694 0.371 
 (0.492) (0.498) (0.49) (0.499) (0.48) (0.461) (0.483) 
Bargaining 0.00 0.137 0.295 0.125 -0.067 0.542 -0.038 
 (1.00) (0.99) (0.987) (0.994) (0.996) (0.894) (0.999) 
Child is a girl (=1 if yes) 0.481 0.476 0.506 0.479 0.479 0.494 0.481 
 (0.5) (0.499) (0.501) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
Child’s birth order  2.798 2.182 1.836 2.250 2.855 2.568 2.945 
 (1.896) (1.362) (1.067) (1.446) (1.892) (1.871) (1.974) 
Child’s HFA z-score -1.918 -1.665 -1.231 -1.659 -1.985 -1.236 -1.988 
 (1.851) (1.737) (1.679) (1.738) (1.86) (1.874) (1.874) 
Child’s WFA z-score -1.788 -1.663 -1.28 -1.639 -1.835 -1.179 -1.828 
 (1.377) (1.293) (1.236) (1.297) (1.391) (1.411) (1.395) 
Childhood Disease Environment Index 0.00 -0.060 0.007 -0.052 0.004 0.048 0.014 
 (1.00) (0.946) (0.985) (0.957) (1.003) (0.992) (1.011) 
Number of children 67,815 9,198 394 11,163 31,211 702 36,691 
Notes: (a) Standard deviation appears in parentheses. (b) Treatment refers to Hindu Succession Act (HSA) 1956 amendment. Treated states are states that amended 
the HSA 1956. Treated religion refers to Hindus (i.e., Hindu, Jain, Sikh, and Buddhist) who are subject to the HSA, and non-treated religion refers to Christians. 
(c) The full sample in column 1 includes both treated and non-treated observations. All in Column 4 refers to observations in the treated states, and All in column 
7 refers to observations in the non-treated states. (d) The following variables are summarized at the mother level: mother's age (years), mother's age at first marriage 
(years), say about large purchase (=1 if yes), say about own health (=1 if yes), go to market alone (=1 if yes), and bargaining. (e) Say about large purchase takes a 
value 1 if the mother has some say in household large purchase decisions, and zero otherwise. Say about own health takes a value 1 if the mother has some say in 
health care choices, and zero otherwise. Go to market alone takes a value 1 if the mother can travel to the market alone, and zero otherwise. (f) Bargaining is defined 
as the first principal component of the three decision variables (i.e., say about a large purchase, say about own health, and go to market alone), and normalized it to 
have zero mean and 1 standard deviation. (g) HFA z-score is the child's height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is the child's weight-for-age z score. These z-
scores are created comparing the sample at hand with the WHO growth standards. (h) Child had a disease in last weeks is defined as the first principal component 











Table 2: Test of Common Trend 
 HFA z-score WFA z-score 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat x Year 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) 
Treat -0.051 0.126 -0.187 -0.131 
 (0.179) (0.171) (0.135) (0.137) 
Year 0.017*** 0.056*** 0.007* 0.043*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Observations 10,331 10,330 10,226 10,224 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  No Yes No Yes 
Note: (a) Treat is a dummy variable equals 1 if the state amended the HSA and equals 
zero otherwise. (b) Year is a linear trend of mother's year of marriage (c) HFA z-
score is the Child’s height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is child’s weight-for-
age z score.  (d) Standard errors are clustered at the PSU level and appear in 
parentheses. (e) Survey year FE are added in all columns. (f) Control variables are: 
mother's age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age 
dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, and 35+ years), child's 
sex, child age dummies (months), and child's birth order (2nd born, and 3rd+ born). 
























































(1= if yes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treat  ×  After  0.183*** 0.276*** 0.805*** -0.013 0.026* 0.173*** 0.139*** -0.064*** 0.359*** 
 (0.065) (0.049) (0.119) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.026) (0.010) (0.048) 
Observations 56,832 56,477 50,338 33,444 33,482 56,796 23,758 56,797 23,633 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: (a) Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is from a state that amended HSA before national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states), and equals zero 
otherwise. (b) After is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the mother was married after the reform in her state and takes zero otherwise. (c) HFA z-score is the 
child's height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is child's weight-for-age z-score. (d) Outcome variables in columns 3-6 are prenatal inputs, and Columns 7-8 are 
postnatal inputs. The outcome variable in column 9 is pooled input, which is the first principal component of the standardized prenatal and postnatal inputs, and then 
normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. (e) Mother took iron supplement and tetanus shot during pregnancy are available only for most recent birth 
(youngest child). (f) Delivery at health facility refers to that childbirth that happened at a health facility. (g) Child ever vaccinated takes 1 if the child received any 
vaccination. (h) Postnatal check within two months of birth is available only for the most recent birth (youngest child) and only in NFHS-2 and NHFS-3. (i) Standard 
errors are clustered by PSU and appear in parentheses. (j) State FE, Year FE (mother's year of birth), State-Year FE, and Survey year FE are added in all columns. (k) 
Control variables are: mother's age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, 
and 35+ years), child's sex, child age dummies (months), and indicators of child's birth order (2nd born and 3rd+ born). (l) Observations used in this table are Hindus 
(i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) only as they are subject to HSA 1956. (m) ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, and 






Table 4: Possible Selection in HSAA 
 Outcome variable: HSA Amendment (=1 if yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average levels in Districts in 1992-93     
HFA 0.026 0.024 - - 
 (0.113) (0.059)   
WFA - - -0.077 -0.049 
   (0.115) (0.070) 
Observations 217 217 217 217 
Controls  No Yes No Yes 
Note: (a) Sample used in this table are Hindus (who are subject to HSA 1956) from the NFHS-I (1992-93) survey 
and states that do not amend HSA until 1993. (b) HSA reform is a dummy variable that equals one if a district is 
subject to the HSA amendment after 1993 (i.e., Karnataka (in 1994) and Maharashtra (in 1994) and equals zero 
otherwise. (c) HFA refers to the mean childrens' height-for-age z-score at the district level, and WFA refers to the 
mean children’s weight-for-age z-score at the district level. (d) Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parentheses. 
Standard errors are bootstrapped to address the small sample issue. (e) Control variables are: mother's age at first 
birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-
35 years, and 35+ years). (f) ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant 















































































(1= if yes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treat × After  -0.049 0.008 -0.033 -0.003 -0.022 0.024 -0.014 -0.053 -0.025 
 (0.442) (0.318) (0.721) (0.064) (0.049) (0.068) (0.279) (0.066) (0.368) 
Observations 1,449 1,441 1,273 830 836 1,448 451 1,448 450 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: (a) Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is from a state that amended HSA before national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states), and equals zero 
otherwise. (b) After is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the mother was married after the reform in her state and takes zero otherwise. (c) HFA z-score is the 
child's height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is child's weight-for-age z-score. (d) Outcome variables in columns 3-6 are prenatal inputs, and columns 7-8 are 
postnatal inputs. The outcome variable in column 9 is pooled input, which is the first principal component of the standardized prenatal and postnatal inputs and 
normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. (e) Mother took iron supplement, and tetanus shot during pregnancy are available only for most recent birth 
(youngest child). (f) Delivery at a health facility refers to that childbirth that happened at a health facility. (g) Child ever vaccinated takes 1 if the child received any 
vaccination. (h) Postnatal check within two months of birth is available only for the most recent birth (youngest child) and only in NFHS-2 and NHFS-3. (i) Standard 
errors are clustered by PSU and appear in parentheses. (j) State FE, Year FE (mother's year of birth), State-Year FE, and Survey year FE are added in all columns. (k) 
Control variables are mother's age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, 
and 35+ years), child's sex, child age dummies (months), and indicators of child's birth order (2nd born and 3rd+ born). (l) Observations used in this table are Christians 






























Mother took iron 
supplement 
during pregnancy 




(=1 if yes) 
Delivery at 
health facility 
(1= if yes) 
Postnatal check 
within two 
months of birth 
(1= if yes) 
Ever vaccinated 
(1= if yes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treat × After × Girl  0.021 0.064** 0.021 0.022** 0.022*** 0.001 -0.005 0.031*** 0.042 
 (0.041) (0.032) (0.085) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.006) (0.033) 
Treat × After 0.149** 0.187*** 0.730*** -0.027* 0.016 0.149*** 0.111*** -0.068*** 0.279*** 
 (0.062) (0.048) (0.117) (0.015) (0.012) (0.018) (0.024) (0.009) (0.045) 
Girl (=1 if yes) 0.041*** -0.006 -0.088*** -0.009* -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.058*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.025) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.011) 
Observations 57,224 56,867 50,702 33,807 33,845 57,188 24,054 57,189 23,928 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: (a) Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is from a state that amended HSA before national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states), and equals zero otherwise. (b) After is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the mother was married after the reform in her state, and takes zero otherwise. (c) HFA z-score is the child's height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is child's weight-for-age z-score. (d) Outcome variables in 
columns 3-6 are prenatal inputs, and columns 7-8 are postnatal inputs. The outcome variable in column 9 is pooled input, which is the first principal component of the standardized prenatal and postnatal inputs, and 
normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. (e) Mother took iron supplement, and tetanus shot during pregnancy are available only for most recent birth (youngest child). (f) Delivery at a health facility refers to 
that childbirth that happened at a health facility. (g) Child ever vaccinated takes 1 if the child received any vaccination. (h) Postnatal check within two months of birth is available only for the most recent birth (youngest 
child) and only in NFHS-2 and NHFS-3. (i) Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in parentheses. (j) State FE, Year FE (mother's year of birth), State-Year FE, and Survey year FE are added in all columns. (k) 
Control variables are: mother's age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, and 35+ years), child age dummies (months), and 
indicators of child's birth order (2nd born and 3rd+ born). (l) Observations used in this table are Hindus (i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) only as they are subject to HSA 1956. (m) ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at 





























Mother took iron 
supplement 
during pregnancy 
(1= if yes) 
Mother took 
tetanus shot during 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treat × After × 2nd Child -0.021 0.038 -0.231** -0.012 0.007 0.030** -0.040* 0.009 -0.096** 
 (0.047) (0.035) (0.094) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.021) (0.007) (0.038) 
Treat × After × 3rd+ Child 0.003 0.046 -0.293** 0.027 0.035*** 0.050*** -0.074*** 0.034*** -0.186*** 
 (0.067) (0.050) (0.132) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.028) (0.010) (0.055) 
Treat × After 0.191*** 0.252*** 0.955*** -0.015 0.015 0.151*** 0.164*** -0.075*** 0.420*** 
 (0.071) (0.054) (0.132) (0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.027) (0.011) (0.051) 
2nd Child (=1 if yes) -0.246*** -0.227*** -0.898*** -0.066*** -0.047*** -0.186*** -0.080*** -0.037*** -0.300*** 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.041) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.018) 
3rd+ Child (=1 if yes) -0.636*** -0.549*** -2.317*** -0.195*** -0.158*** -0.398*** -0.157*** -0.096*** -0.676*** 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.052) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.022) 
Observations 56,832 56,477 50,338 33,444 33,482 56,796 23,758 56,797 23,633 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: (a) Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is from a state that amended HSA before national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states), and equals zero otherwise. (b) After is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
1 if the mother was married after the reform in her state, and takes zero otherwise. (c) HFA z-score is the Child's height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is child's weight-for-age z-score. (d) Outcome variables in columns 5-8 are 
prenatal inputs, and Columns 7-8 are postnatal inputs. The outcome variable in column 8 is pooled input, which is the first principal component of the standardized prenatal and postnatal inputs, and normalized to mean zero and 
standard deviation one. (e) Mother took iron supplement and tetanus shot during pregnancy are available only for most recent birth (youngest child). (f) Delivery at a health facility refers to that childbirth that happened at a health 
facility. (g) Child ever vaccinated takes 1 if the child received any vaccination. (h) Postnatal check within two months of birth is available only for the most recent birth (youngest child) and only in NFHS-2 and NHFS-3. (i) 
Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in parentheses. (j) State FE, Year FE (mother's year of birth), State-Year FE, and Survey year FE are added in all columns. (k) Control variables are: mother's age at first birth, 
mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, and 35+ years), child's sex, and child age dummies (months). (l) 2nd child is an indicator for children whose 
birth order is 2, and 3rd+ child is an indicator for children whose birth order is 3 or higher. (m) Observations used in this table are Hindus (i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) only as they are subject to HSA 1956. (m) 























Mother took iron 
supplement during 
pregnancy (1= if yes) 
Mother took tetanus 
shot during 
pregnancy (=1 if yes) 
Delivery at 
health facility 
(1= if yes) 
Postnatal check 
within two months 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treat × After × 2nd Child × Girl 0.083 -0.016 0.001 0.047* 0.019 0.028 0.052 0.022* 0.086 
 (0.095) (0.076) (0.193) (0.025) (0.018) (0.023) (0.039) (0.012) (0.073) 
Treat × After × 3rd+ Child × Girl 0.191 0.113 0.063 0.048 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.040 
 (0.120) (0.094) (0.221) (0.032) (0.024) (0.032) (0.050) (0.017) (0.092) 
Treat × After × 2nd Child -0.062 0.047 -0.232* -0.034** -0.001 0.016 -0.065** -0.000 -0.137*** 
 (0.066) (0.050) (0.134) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.027) (0.009) (0.053) 
Treat × After × 3rd+ Child -0.087 -0.005 -0.324* 0.005 0.026 0.043* -0.082** 0.026** -0.205*** 
 (0.088) (0.068) (0.165) (0.023) (0.017) (0.024) (0.038) (0.012) (0.072) 
Treat × After × Girl -0.060 0.031 -0.029 -0.009 0.002 -0.014 -0.025 0.012 -0.015 
 (0.063) (0.050) (0.134) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.025) (0.008) (0.049) 
2nd Child × Girl -0.118*** -0.058* -0.074 -0.008 -0.009 -0.020* -0.001 -0.009 -0.032 
 (0.041) (0.032) (0.077) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.033) 
3rd+ Child × Girl -0.112*** -0.094*** -0.153** -0.014 -0.033*** -0.015* 0.006 -0.030*** -0.061** 
 (0.038) (0.029) (0.062) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.028) 
Treat × After 0.220*** 0.237*** 0.969*** -0.011 0.014 0.158*** 0.176*** -0.081*** 0.426*** 
 (0.078) (0.059) (0.148) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.030) (0.012) (0.058) 
2nd Child (=1 if yes) -0.189*** -0.199*** -0.862*** -0.062*** -0.043*** -0.176*** -0.080*** -0.032*** -0.284*** 
 (0.030) (0.023) (0.055) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.024) 
3rd+ Child (=1 if yes) -0.581*** -0.504*** -2.244*** -0.188*** -0.143*** -0.391*** -0.160*** -0.081*** -0.646*** 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.059) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.026) 
Girl (=1 if yes) 0.122*** 0.051** -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.026** -0.012** -0.019 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.055) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.024) 
Observations 56,832 56,477 50,338 33,444 33,482 56,796 23,758 56,797 23,633 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: (a) Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is from a state that amended HSA before national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states), and equals zero otherwise. (b) After is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
mother was married after the reform in her state, and takes zero otherwise. (c) HFA z-score is the Child's height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is child's weight-for-age z-score. (d) Outcome variables in columns 3-6 are prenatal inputs, 
and Columns 7-8 are postnatal inputs. The outcome variable in column 9 is pooled input, which is the first principal component of the standardized prenatal and postnatal inputs, and normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one. 
(e) Mother took iron supplement, and tetanus shot during pregnancy are available only for most recent birth (youngest child). (f) Delivery at a health facility refers to that childbirth that happened at a health facility. (g) Child ever vaccinated 
takes 1 if the child received any vaccination. (h) Postnatal check within two months of birth is available only for the most recent birth (youngest child) and only in NFHS-2 and NHFS-3. (i) Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear 
in parentheses. (j) State FE, Year FE (mother's year of birth), State-Year FE, and Survey year FE are added in all columns. (k) Control variables are: mother's age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age 
dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, and 35+ years), child's sex, child age dummies (months), and child's birth order (2nd born, and 3rd+ born). (l) 2nd child is an indicator for children whose birth order is 2, and 
3rd+ child is an indicator for children whose birth order is 3 or higher. (m) Girl is an indicator for the children who are girls. (n) Observations used in this table are Hindus (i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) only as they are subject 




Table 9: Mechanisms of the Effect of HSAA on Child Health 
 














(=1 if yes) 
Piped Water 





















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treat × After  -1.618*** 5.732*** 0.136*** 0.145*** -0.057 0.103*** 0.107*** 0.077*** 0.267*** 
 (0.045) (0.103) (0.015) (0.021) (0.038) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.037) 
Observations 46,495 46,495 45,174 46,495 46,422 32,490 32,491 32,709 32,490 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: (a) Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is from a state that amended HSA before national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states), and equals zero otherwise. 
(b) After is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the mother was married after the reform in her state, and takes zero otherwise. (c) We use two indicators of women's 
fertility choices: total children born and mother's age at first marriage. Total children born is the number of children born to a mother. (d) We use two indicators of household 
wealth: access to electricity and piped water. (e) The incidence of disease measures the disease environment of the household in the last two weeks. Child had a disease in the last 
weeks is defined as the first principal component of the three variables (child had fever, cough, and diarrhea in last two weeks), and normalized to have mean zero and standard 
deviation one. (f) We use three indicators of bargaining: the woman has a say in large purchases and her health care and can go to market alone. Bargaining in column 9 is 
defined as the first principal component of the three decision variables (say about a large purchase, say about own health, and go to market alone), and normalized it to have zero 
mean and 1 standard deviation. (g) Standard errors are clustered at the PSU level and appear in parentheses. (h) State FE, Year FE (mother's year of birth), State-Year FE, and 
Survey year FE are added in all columns. (i) Control variables are: mother's age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, and mother's current age dummies (15-20 years, 
21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, and 35+ years) (j) Sample used in this table are Hindus (i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) only as only they are subject to HSA 





























































(1= if yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Bargaining 0.446* 0.949*** 2.868*** -0.060 0.087* 0.556*** 0.394*** -0.042 1.010*** 
 (0.252) (0.224) (0.553) (0.060) (0.051) (0.102) (0.090) (0.034) (0.179) 
Observations 39,711 39,492 33,261 33,233 33,270 39,680 23,662 39,677 23,538 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st stage F-
stat 
45.78 45.82 48.36 46.01 47.06 45.59 49.66 45.70 50.80 
Notes: (a) Sample used in this table are Hindus (i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) as only they are subject to HSA 1956. (b) HFA z-score is the Child's 
height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is the child's weight-for-age z-score. (c) Outcome variables in columns 5-8 are prenatal inputs, and Columns 7-8 are 
postnatal inputs. The outcome variable in column 8 is pooled input, which is the first principal component of the standardized prenatal and postnatal inputs and 
normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. (d) Mother took iron supplement and tetanus shot during pregnancy are available only for most recent 
birth (youngest child). (e) Delivery at a health facility refers to that childbirth that happened at a health facility as opposed to childbirth at home. (f) Child ever 
vaccinated takes 1 if the child received any vaccination. (g) Postnatal check within two months of birth is available only for the most recent birth (youngest child) 
and only in NFHS-2 and NHFS-3. (h) Clustered Standard errors by PSU are in parentheses. (i) State FE, Year FE (mother's year of birth), State-Year FE, and 
Survey year FE are added in all columns. (j) Bargaining is instrumented by Treat X After. Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is from a state 
that amended HSA prior to national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states) and equals zero otherwise. After is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the mother 
was married after the reform in her state and takes zero otherwise. (k) Control variables are: mother's age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's 
current age dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, and 35+ years), child's sex, child age dummies (months), and indicators of child's birth 





























Mother took iron 
supplement 
during pregnancy 




(=1 if yes) 
Delivery at 
health facility 
(1= if yes) 
Postnatal check 
within two 
months of birth 
(1= if yes) 
Ever 
vaccinated 
(1= if yes) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treat × After × Age 2 years 0.160***  0.171*** 0.047 -0.018 0.009 0.013 -0.003 -0.082*** -0.021 
 (0.062)  (0.046) (0.104) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.008) (0.036) 
Treat × After × Age 3 years 0.206***  0.072 0.018 -0.007 0.009 -0.001 -0.031 -0.096*** -0.073* 
 (0.061)  (0.046) (0.106) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.022) (0.009) (0.039) 
Treat × After × Age 4 years 0.131*  -0.019 0.271* -0.084*** -0.040*** 0.023 -0.251*** -0.107*** -0.578*** 
 (0.072)  (0.056) (0.158) (0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.046) (0.011) (0.102) 
Treat × After × Age 5 years 0.116  -0.027 0.189 -0.075*** -0.049*** 0.010 -0.252*** -0.096*** -0.661*** 
 (0.071)  (0.055) (0.201) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.064) (0.011) (0.129) 
Treat × After 0.059  0.170*** 0.673*** 0.005 0.031** 0.142*** 0.126*** 0.013 0.343*** 
 (0.072)  (0.056) (0.127) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.025) (0.012) (0.046) 
Age 2 years (1= if yes) -1.105***  -0.368*** -0.049 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.017* 0.114*** 0.044** 
 (0.029)  (0.022) (0.042) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.019) 
Age 3 years (1= if yes) -1.174***  -0.407*** -0.089 -0.013 -0.012 -0.002 -0.026* 0.101*** 0.015 
 (0.041)  (0.032) (0.065) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.029) 
Age 4 years (1= if yes) -1.083***  -0.390*** -0.143 0.010 0.022 -0.021 -0.006 0.062*** 0.111** 
 (0.059)  (0.044) (0.094) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.045) 
Age 5 years (1= if yes) -0.761***  -0.333*** -0.055 -0.009 -0.003 -0.027 0.006 0.051*** 0.026 
 (0.075)  (0.057) (0.140) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.015) (0.058) 
Observations 57,224  56,867 50,702 33,807 33,845 57,188 24,054 57,189 23,928 
State FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: (a) Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is from a state that amended HSA prior to national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states), and equals zero otherwise. (b) After is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the mother 
was married after the reform in her state, and takes zero otherwise. (c) Child age is categorized into 5 groups– age 1 year (0-12 months), age 2 years (13-24 months), age 3 years (25-36 months), age 4 years (37-48 months), and age 5 years (49-60 
months). (d) HFA z-score is the child’s height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is child’s weight-for-age z-score. (e) Outcome variables in columns 3-6 are prenatal inputs, and columns 7-8 are postnatal inputs. The outcome variable in column 9 
is pooled input, which is the first principal component of the standardized prenatal and postnatal inputs, and normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. (f) Mother took iron supplement, and tetanus shot during pregnancy are available 
only for most recent birth (youngest child). (g) Delivery at a health facility refers to that childbirth that happened at a health facility as opposed to childbirth at home. (h) Child ever vaccinated takes 1 if the child received any vaccination. (i) Postnatal 
check within two months of birth is available only for the most recent birth (youngest child) and only in NFHS-2 and NHFS-3. (j) Standard errors are clustered by PSU and appear in parentheses. (k) State FE, Year FE (mother's year of birth), State-
Year FE, and Survey year FE are added in all columns. (l) Control variables are: mother's age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, and 35+ years), child's 
sex, and indicators of child's birth order (2nd born and 3rd+ born). (m) Observations used in this table are Hindus (i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) only as they are subject to HSA 1956. (n) ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent 


















Total prenatal visits 
during pregnancy 
Mother took iron 
supplement during 
pregnancy (1= if yes) 
Mother took tetanus 
shot during pregnancy 
(=1 if yes) 
Delivery at 
health facility 
(1= if yes) 
Postnatal check 
within two months of 
birth (1= if yes) 
Ever vaccinated 
(1= if yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Hindu         
Bargaining × 2nd Child 0.059 0.231 -0.742 -0.047 0.034 0.208*** -0.103 0.005 -0.289 
 (0.205) (0.184) (0.535) (0.052) (0.036) (0.075) (0.176) (0.028) (0.368) 
Bargaining × 3rd+ Child 0.181 0.168 -0.887 0.101 0.108** 0.257** -0.473*** 0.044 -1.195*** 
 (0.290) (0.256) (0.659) (0.067) (0.052) (0.120) (0.142) (0.039) (0.311) 
Bargaining 0.395 0.821*** 3.367*** -0.054 0.053 0.425*** 0.566*** -0.050 1.455*** 
 (0.284) (0.250) (0.652) (0.069) (0.058) (0.116) (0.125) (0.039) (0.265) 
2nd Child (=1 if yes) -0.259*** -0.200*** -0.952*** -0.069*** -0.042*** -0.177*** -0.097*** -0.026*** -0.350*** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.063) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.030) (0.004) (0.061) 
3rd+ Child (=1 if yes) -0.641*** -0.476*** -2.309*** -0.196*** -0.139*** -0.364*** -0.207*** -0.071*** -0.804*** 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.103) (0.012) (0.010) (0.018) (0.025) (0.006) (0.053) 
Observations 39,711 39,492 33,261 33,233 33,270 39,680 23,662 39,677 23,538 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st stage F-stat 30.10 29.23 29.98 29.86 29.92 30.05 20.47 30.15 20.33 
Notes: (a) Sample used in this table are Hindus (i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) only as only they are subject to HSA 1956. (b) HFA z-score is the Child's height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is the child's weight-for-age z-score. (c) 
Outcome variables in columns 3-6 are prenatal inputs, and Columns 7-8 are postnatal inputs. The outcome variable in column 9 is pooled input, which is the first principal component of the standardized prenatal and postnatal inputs, and normalized 
to have mean zero and standard deviation one. (d) Mother took iron supplement and tetanus shot during pregnancy are available only for most recent birth (youngest child). (e) Delivery at a health facility refers to that childbirth that happened at a 
health facility as opposed to childbirth at home. (f) Child ever vaccinated takes 1 if the child received any vaccination. (g) Postnatal check within two months of birth is available only for the most recent birth (youngest child) and only in NFHS-2 and 
NHFS-3. (h) Clustered Standard errors by PSU are in parentheses. (i) State FE, Year FE (mother's year of birth), State-Year FE, and Survey year FE are added in all columns. (j) Bargaining is instrumented by Treat X After. Treat is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the mother is from a state that amended HSA prior to national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states) and equals zero otherwise. After is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the mother was married after the reform in her state and 
takes zero otherwise. (k) Control variables are: mother's age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, and 35+ years), child's sex, and child age dummies 
(months). (l) 2nd child is an indicator for children whose birth order is 2, and 3rd+ child is an indicator for children whose birth order is 3 or higher. (m) ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, and *Significant at the 





















Mother took iron 
supplement 
during pregnancy 




(=1 if yes) 
Delivery at 
health facility 
(1= if yes) 
Postnatal check 
within two 
months of birth 
(1= if yes) 
Ever 
vaccinate
d (1= if 
yes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Hindu          
Bargaining × 2nd Child × Girl 0.252 -0.012 0.325 0.187* 0.082 0.240 0.228 0.077 0.321 
 (0.404) (0.380) (1.045) (0.102) (0.072) (0.163) (0.341) (0.053) (0.729) 
Bargaining × 3rd+ Child × Girl 0.524 0.263 -0.293 0.155 0.023 -0.068 0.033 0.067 0.039 
 (0.464) (0.414) (1.064) (0.114) (0.086) (0.189) (0.253) (0.064) (0.541) 
Bargaining × 2nd Child -0.052 0.240 -0.888 -0.127* -0.002 0.101 -0.223 -0.028 -0.497 
 (0.271) (0.234) (0.679) (0.070) (0.046) (0.097) (0.225) (0.037) (0.459) 
Bargaining × 3rd+ Child -0.063 0.043 -0.737 0.034 0.100 0.296* -0.477** 0.014 -1.200*** 
 (0.372) (0.314) (0.847) (0.088) (0.065) (0.166) (0.191) (0.050) (0.389) 
Bargaining × Girl -0.034 0.283 0.106 -0.043 0.016 -0.035 -0.035 0.003 0.171 
 (0.253) (0.225) (0.757) (0.067) (0.049) (0.086) (0.176) (0.032) (0.425) 
2nd Child × Girl -0.073 -0.050 -0.107 -0.001 -0.008 -0.013 0.043 -0.004 0.021 
 (0.046) (0.042) (0.130) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.053) (0.007) (0.117) 
3rd+ Child × Girl -0.049 -0.109*** -0.190 0.002 -0.028*** -0.008 0.011 -0.022*** -0.070 
 (0.046) (0.041) (0.125) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.045) (0.007) (0.097) 
Bargaining 0.349 0.611** 3.326*** -0.052 0.038 0.452*** 0.570*** -0.061 1.331*** 
 (0.319) (0.275) (0.726) (0.076) (0.062) (0.127) (0.143) (0.043) (0.297) 
2nd Child (=1 if yes) -0.223*** -0.174*** -0.896*** -0.067*** -0.037*** -0.168*** -0.119*** -0.023*** -0.364*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.089) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.034) (0.005) (0.069) 
3rd+ Child (=1 if yes) -0.621*** -0.430*** -2.220*** -0.198*** -0.127*** -0.359*** -0.213*** -0.061*** -0.773*** 
 (0.048) (0.042) (0.124) (0.014) (0.011) (0.022) (0.033) (0.007) (0.067) 
Girl (=1 if yes) 0.065** 0.042 -0.020 -0.004 0.001 -0.011 -0.037 -0.002 0.009 
 (0.032) (0.028) (0.102) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.036) (0.004) (0.085) 
Observations 39,711 39,492 33,261 33,233 33,270 39,680 23,662 39,677 23,538 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st stage F-stat 15.76 15.25 15.49 15.46 15.54 15.74 11.47 15.81 11.21 
Notes: (a) Sample used in this table are Hindus (i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) only as only they are subject to HSA 1956. (b) HFA z-score is the Child's height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is the child's 
weight-for-age z-score. (c) Outcome variables in columns 3-6 are prenatal inputs, and Columns 7-8 are postnatal inputs. The outcome variable in column 9 is pooled input, which is the first principal component of the 
standardized prenatal and postnatal inputs, and normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. (d) Mother took iron supplement and tetanus shot during pregnancy are available only for most recent birth 
(youngest child). (e) Delivery at a health facility refers to that childbirth that happened at a health facility as opposed to childbirth at home. (f) Child ever vaccinated takes 1 if the child received any vaccination. (g) 
Postnatal check within two months of birth is available only for the most recent birth (youngest child) and only in NFHS-2 and NHFS-3. (h) Clustered Standard errors by PSU are in parentheses. (i) State FE, Year FE 
(mother's year of birth), State-Year FE, and Survey year FE are added in all columns.  (j) Bargaining is instrumented by Treat X After. Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is from a state that amended HSA 
prior to national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states) and equals zero otherwise. After is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the mother was married after the reform in her state and takes zero otherwise. (k) Control 
variables are: mother's age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, and 35+ years), child's sex, and child age dummies (months). (l) 
2nd child is an indicator for children whose birth order is 2, and 3rd+ child is an indicator for children whose birth order is 3 or higher. (m) Girl is an indicator for the children who are girls. (n) ***Significant at the 1 
percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, and *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bargaining 0.048*** 0.446* 0.053 0.041*** 0.949*** 0.048 
 (0.010) (0.252) [0.072] (0.008) (0.224) [0.061] 
Observations 40,101 39,711 39,763 39,880 39,492 39,546 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (a) Sample used in this table are Hindus (i.e., Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs) as only they are 
subject to HSA 1956. (b) HFA z-score is the Child’s height-for-age z-score, and WFA z-score is the child's 
weight-for-age z-score. (c) Columns 1 and 4 reports OLS regression coefficients, columns 2 and 5 report IV 
regression coefficients, and columns 3 and 6 report imperfect IV regression coefficients. (d) We follow the 
approach by Nevo and Rosen to get the Imperfect IV estimates.  We present the upper bound of the imperfect IV 
estimates, which lies in between the OLS and IV coefficients. (e) Clustered Standard errors by PSU are in 
parentheses. (f) The upper bound of the 95% confidence intervals are in the brackets (g) State FE, Year FE 
(mother's year of birth), State-Year FE, and Survey year FE are added in all columns. (h) Bargaining is 
instrumented by Treat x After. Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is from a state that amended 
HSA prior to national adoption in 2005 (i.e., reform states) and equals zero otherwise. After is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the mother was married after the reform in her state and takes zero otherwise. (i) 
Control variables are: mother’s age at first birth, mother's age at first birth squared, mother's current age 
dummies (15-20 years, 21-25 years, 26-30 years, 31-35 years, and 35+ years), child's sex, child age dummies 
(months), and indicators of child's birth order (2nd born, and 3rd+ born). (j) ***Significant at the 1 percent level, 
**Significant at the 5 percent level, and *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
